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ABSTRACT
The search for "growth-oriented adjustment programs" reflects a
widespread malaise concerning IMF stabilization programs in countries
suffering from external debt crises. A new orthodoxy is emerging from this
search, which links recovery in the debtor countries to a shift to
"outward-oriented" development, based on trade liberalization. Thispaper
describes many important limitations of this new orthodoxy. The heavy
emphasis on liberalization is ahistorical, and indeed runs contrary to the
experiences of the successful East Asian economies. It also distracts
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The search for "growth-oriented adjustment programs" reflects a
widespread malaise concerning IMF stabilization programs in countries
suffering from external debt crises. After several years of poor economic,
performance, most of the LOC debtor countries under IMF supervision have still
not resumed economic growth. The political will of the debtor governments to
continue with IMF adjustment programs, much less debt servicing, is clearly on
the wane. The cooperative arrangements between debtors, creditors, and the
IMF which have been in place for the past five years seem to be in danger of
collapsing. Hence, the search is on for new policies that might enable the
debtor countries to resume economic growth while continuing to service their
debts.
A new orthodoxy is emerging from this search, which links recovery in the
debtor countries to a shift to "outward-oriented" development strategies,
designed to produce export-led growth. Increased exports from the debtor
countries are seen as the key to more output, more employment, and more
foreign exchange to service the foreign debts. The new orthodoxy defines the
policy content of "outward orientation" to include the following measures: (1)
trade liberalization, especially the conversion of quantitative restrictions
to low, uniform tariffs; (2) real exchange rate depreciation, and unification
of the exchange rate; (3) an emphasis on the private sector as the source of
growth, including the privatisation of state enterprises; and (4) a general
reduction in all forms of market intervention by the government, in capital
markets, factor markets, and in the overall level of government taxation and-2—
expenditure. This "liberalization package" is urged by the U.S. government as
part of the Baker Plan, by many influential academicians, and by the IMF and
World Bank (as exemplified by the papers by Guitian and Michalopoulos for this
conference).
The perceived urgency of such liberalization policies is causing a
redesign of IMF and the World Bank programs. Increasingly, the liberalization
package, including the attendant exchange rate management, is viewed by both
institutions as a key tool of crisis management in the debtor countries. IMF
missions put ever-increasing stress on the promotion of exports, mainly by
urging an activist policy of exchange rate depreciation to raise export
profitability. Inflation targets are downplayed in the process. This
increased emphasis on exchange rate adjustment was suggested recently by data
in IMF Occasional Paper No. 36. on IMF exchange rate policies, which shows
that while exchange rate actions were contained in only 31 percent of IMF
programs during 1963-72, such actions were part of 51 percent of programs
during 1973-80, and 64 percent of programs during 1981-83 (and fully 82
percent, if countries belonging to monetary unions are excluded from the
sample).
With respect to the World Bank, structural adjustment loans and sectoral
adjustment loans are becoming a much bigger part of World Bank business. With
increasing frequency and perceived urgency, the World Bank is offering
detailed blueprints for deregulation, privatisation, and trade liberalization
to member countries. Policy-based lending (as opposed to project lending)
accounted for no less than 35 percent of World Bank lending to the heavily
indebted countries in 1986, up from less than 10 percent five years ago.-3-
Additionally, the IMF and the World Bank are increasingly working in tandemto
plan medium-term programs to support "outward-oriented" structural
adjustments.
As a general matter, there is much evidence of the relativesuccess of
outward-oriented development strategies over inward-orienteddevelopment
strategies. The outward-oriented developing economies of East Asia have
certainly outperformed the inward-looking economies of Latin America, a
conclusion which has been reached by many observers,including the present
author (see Balassa, 1982 and Sachs, 1985,among others). It is also
plausible to link much of this superior performance directly to the trade
regime. But general observations such as these do not really justify the
equation of outward orientation with market liberalization, nor theemphasis
on liberalization as an instrument of crisis management in the debtor
countries. In my view, the increasing policy emphasis on liberalizationas a
tool of debt crisis management is fraught with difficulties.
At the very least, the strategy can find little historicalsupport. The
success stories of East Asia, so frequently pointed to as illustrations of the
benefits of export-led growth, do not demonstrate theutility of trade
liberalization in the midst of a macroeconomic crisis. In the firstplace,
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan did not adopt their strategies during, or inresponse
to, macroeconomic or debt crises. These countries solved their macroeconomic
and financial difficulties of the late 1940s and early 1950slong before they
embarked on the path of export-led growth. The real historicalcases of
liberalization during macroeconomic crisis are the Southern Cone countries
(Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) during the 1970s, and these episodes are-4-
well-known debacles, in part because of the conflicting requirements of
stabilization and liberalization.
Moreover, the East Asian exemplars of outward orientation demonstrate the
practical distinction between export promotion and liberalization, i.e.,
laissez-faire policies, a distinction which casts doubt on some of the policy
advice emanating from the international institutions (see Bhagwati, 1975, for
an entertaining and astute discussion of similar points). In the case of
Japan, for example, MIII is today world famous for its use of foreign exchange
controls and administrative guidance to spur export industries, but the World
Bank is apparently not recommending such activist ministries in countries
seeking to promote exports! Nor is it advocating that governments pursue
policies to support the formation of giant trading companies, as in Korea.
The East Asian experience suggests that export promotion policies can be
pursued (and maybe have been most successfully pursued) by a dirigiste
government, and even in the presence of tight import controls and tight
regulations in the capital markets.
The important role of the government in East Asian development does not,
of course, imply that the public sector should be involved in every aspect of
economic affairs. Moreover, the successes of dirigiste policies in East Asia
have likely depended on the presence of a highly educated and well trained
professional bureaucracy in these countries, a crucial human capital base that
is currently lacking in many other developing countries. The Asian experience
does suggest, however, that successful development might be helped as much by
raising the quality of public sector management as by privitizing public
enterprises or liberalizing markets.—5—
From a global point of view, liberalization might be defended not as in
the interest of the initiating country, but rather in the interest of therest
of the world, to the extent that trade restrictions arebeggar-thy-neighbor
policies. Some of the U.S. pressures for liberalization 'inthedeveloping
countries (e.g. vis-a-vis Brazil, Korea, and Mexico) indeed emanate more from
concerns about U.S. trading interests than from concerns about the welfare of
the developing countries. However, to the extent that this is the real
motivation for pressures for liberalization, then it should be acknowledged
that poor countries in dire economic difficulties are being pressed to make
rapid structural changes on behalf of the rest of the world.
The current focus on liberalization distracts attention from otherurgent
needs of the debtor countries, by overloading the political circuits in those
countries, and by absorbing the energies and attention of the international
financial community. In countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico,
and Peru, with high inflation levels and acute macroeconomic imbalances,only
a return to a position of greater fiscal balance and lower inflation, will
provide a macroeconomic foundation of stability necessary for sustained
growth. As there are macroeconomic and political limits to cutting budget
deficits in the short run, and as these limits are especially constraining in
the middle of an economic crisis, debt forgiveness and moregenerous foreign
aid may have a role to play in stabilizing the economies of a number of
countries. Moreover, I shall emphasize that the attempt to stimulate exports
at all costs through trade liberalizations or aggressive depreciations of the
exchange rate can often undermine a stabilization program and thus postpone a
resolution of debt crisis.-6-
Since comparative case studies provide a good antidote to facile
orthodoxy, and since the goal of this paper is to urge a bit less neoclassical
orthodoxy and a bit more realism in the analysis of exchange rate and trade
policies that are recommended to the middle-income debtor countries,
section II is devoted to a further discussion of the experiences of the East
Asian countries. Then, in Section III of the paper, 1 turn the focus to Latin
America, to take up the linkages of exchange rate policy, budget policy, and
debt relief. Discussions of exchange rate management sometimes leave the
impression that there is a technical fix for the exchange rate that can be
divorced from budget policies, issues of income distribution, and so on.
Nothing could be further from the truth, as I hope to stress.
II. Policy Aspects of Outward-Oriented Growth in East Asia
Let us begin with a country example. Country "X" pegged its currency to
the dollar in 1950, and kept the nominal parity absolutely fixed for more than
twenty years. During the first fifteen years of this period (until 1964),
foreign exchange was strictly rationed by a government agency, and the
currency was always overvalued. PPP calculations using home and U.S.
consumer price indices show a 60 percent real appreciation in the 20 year
period. A Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949 required
that exporters remit all earnings to the government within 10 days, making the
government the only legal source of foreign exchange, a privilege jealously
guarded by the bureaucrats in charge of foreign exchange rationing. No
explicit rules governed the distribution of foreign exchange. Bureaucrats
allocated foreign exchange to favored sectors, and clearly gave attention to—7—
particular firms that they were interested in nurturing. Government
bureaucrats often retired to those firms at the end of their official careers.
Rationing was so tight that private individuals were not allowed any foreign
exchange for tourism abroad between 1950 and 1964.
Domestic capital markets were highly regulated, and completely shut off
from world capital markets. The government was the only sector with access to
international borrowing and lending. Foreign direct investment was heavily
circumscribed, with majority ownership by foreign firms both legally and
administratively barred. During the early to mid-1950s, about a third of
external funds for industrial investment originated in loans from government
financial institutions, at preferential rates that varied across firms and
industries. These state financial institutions remained an important source
of cheap financing until the 1960s.
The country in question, as will be familiar to many, is Japan. But the
description sounds like many countries in Latin America, complete with
overvalued exchange rates, foreign exchange rationing, restrictions on foreign
direct investment, government allocation of credit, and so on.Moreover,
this policy framework was in place for much of the "rapid growth period" in
Japan (conventionally dated as 1955-1973), which may arguably be the most
remarkable two decades of a country's economic development in world history.
I begin with this example to urge on the reader a humble and inductive state
of mind regarding growth-oriented adjustment. The policies of "outward
orientation" in Japan, and in East Asia generally, have not been modelled on a
free market approach as is frequently asserted.
Even though the real lessons of the East Asian successes are not yet
understood by scholars, a brief review of the experiences of Japan, Korea, and—8-
Taiwan, (henceforth JKT), can do much to inform the current debate about
growth-oriented adjustment programs. The histories of JKT demonstrate that,
while not mainly free market in spirit, these governments have consistently
followed certain basic precepts in the design of their economic policies.
First, government budgets have generally been maintained near balance, often
with large surpluses on the current account of the budget. Tight budgets have
had several salutary effects. Inflation rates have been low and fairly
stable, since governments in East Asia have not had to resort to the inflation
tax for purposes of government finance.This has meant, among other things,
that nominal exchange rates could be maintained at fairly stable levels
without jeopardizing export profitability. Also, with surpluses in the
current account of the budget, government savings have contributed to the
rapid rate of capital accumulation in these countries. A third benefit of
tight budgets has been that governments have had the resources and flexibility
to use subsidies and other fiscal incentives to promote particular sectors of
the economy, or to offset reductions in general export profitability that
might arise from an overvaluation of the nominal exchange rate.
With respect to export policy, once these economies started on the path
of export-led growth in the early 1960s, the profitability of exports was
jealously guarded, not through a generalized liberalization of imports, but
rather through a combination of exchange rate management and fiscal incentives
for exports. Incentives have generally been applied to promote exports with a
natural comparative advantage (labor-intensive manufactures initially;
capital-intensive manufactures later). Agriculture has not been taxed, but if
anything protected, relative to industry. Nominal exchange rates have been—9-.
adjusted periodically to keep real exchange rates at realistic levels (a
policy which has been easier to pursue than in Latin America because of the
lower inflation), and when exchange rates have become overvalued, they have
been devalued or compensated for by greater export subsidies. In the three
countries, exporters have enjoyed certain key fiscal incentives, especially
the rebate on tariffs that they paid on imported inputs for export production,
low or zero export taxes, and subsidized credits. A cardinal principle for
export policy has been to maintain the input and output prices faced by
exporters at world levels so that exporters may compete effectively with
foreign firms facing similar prices and technology.
The preservation of export profitability is an orthodox policy
recommendation, but much else about export promotion in Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan deviates significantly from typical IMF-World Bank policy
recommendations. This is not surprising given the absence of a liberal
tradition in the histories of any of these countries. In each of the
countries, policymaking on exports has started from the premise that
successful export promotion requires the import of foreign technologies and
the exploitation of static and dynamic scale economies, and this must take
place in the context of weak and fragmented domestic capital markets. In
these circumstances, purely free markets have little to recommend, and even
neoclassical economics recognizes a strong potential case for government
intervention, as was recently stressed by Robert Lucas (1986). The case for
intervention is strongest when the adoption of new technologies involves
positive externalities (e.g. via industry-wide learning curves), or when
production involves significant economies of scale.-10-
In Japan, the government role started as far back as the Meiji
restoration, when state enterprises were set up as the country's first
exporting firms. As Smith (1955, p. 102) notes in his classic study of the
Meiji period,
In developing modern industry the government had no choice but to
act as entrepreneur, financier, and manager. Except in the silk
industry, where uniquely favorable conditions prevailed, private
capital was too weak, too timid, and too inexperienced to undertake
development --evenwith government aid which was given generously
but without initial success.
Johnson (1982) details many of the features of government intervention in the
years after World War II. In this period, the promotion of industry was less
through direct state production than through an activist role of the
government in supporting large enterprises, strengthening their bargaining
position vis-a-vis foreign firms (especially in the licensing of foreign
technologies and in the imports of raw materials), and preventing their
acquisition by foreign firms. Until the 1960s, for example, Japan maintained
strong explicit controls on foreign direct investments into the country (e.g.,
by requiring Japanese majority ownership of firms), and even after the formal
liberalization, MIII has continued to block foreign direct investments in
industries that MITI is trying to promote.
The whole nexus of Japanese policies may be seen as having the goal of
fostering domestic entrepreneurs, with a sound technology base, and with a
strong bargaining position vis—a-vis foreign rivals in home and foreign
markets. Other policies discussed by Johnson in support of these goals
include: the state role in allocating credit through state banks and the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (which is the public sector investment budget,—11-P
under the control of the Ministry of Finance); the elaborate tradepromotion
apparatus of MIII; the virtually total control over foreign exchange by MIII
until 1964; the virtually total screening of foreign capitalimports and
exports by MITI and the Ministry of Finance until 1980 (despite de jure
liberalization of foreign direct investment in the 1960s); andpublic-private
forums such as the Industrial Rationalization Councils runby MITI.
Taiwan has also pursued activist industrial policies, that are most
marked in the large role of state-owned enterprises in the industrialsector.
Taiwan is more heavily dependent on state-owned industry than isprobably any
country in Latin America, with the possible exception of Venezuela. During
1978-80, for example, state-owned industry in Taiwan accounted for no less
than 32 percent of domestic capital formation, while the comparable shares for
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were 19.6 percent, 22.8 percent, and 29.4
percent respectively.1 Outside of the state sector, the government has
encouraged small and medium-sized enterprises through a variety of tax
incentives and regulatory policies.
Korean export policies have differed from Taiwan's, and have been closer
to Japan's, in the emphasis on fostering large-scale firms in the private
sector through extensive state support. A major policy instrument has been
interest rate subsidies for export firms. While many observers feel that the
emphasis on state support of heavy industry was pushed too far at the end of
the 1970s, government support was critical in development of several
industries, particularly iron and steel, cement, fertilizers, and petroleum.
As in Japan, the state has consciously fostered a few large trading firms that
account for a large share of the country's international trade.Table 1: The State Sector in the Macro Economy, Selected












Japan 18.9 n.a. n.a. 11.6
Korea 19.5 19.1 6.4 25.1
Taiwan 27.5 20.0 13.6 35.0
Argentina 21.6 16.5 4.8 20.7
Brazil 21.8 26.1 n.a. 22.8
Mexico 31.7 17.0 27.0
apercent of Aggregate GOP at factor cost.
bpercent of total fixed investment.
cLargest 22 state enterprises only.
Source:
Government Expenditures: Japan, Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico from
WDR, Table 26, 1986. For Taiwan, Myers (1986), p. 43. Data are for 1982 for
all countries except Taiwan, for which 1981 is reported. Government revenues,
same as expenditures. State enterprise data are from Floyd, et al. (1984),
Table 1, and apply for the following years: Japan, 1974-77; Korea, 1974-77;
Taiwan, 1974-77; Argentina, 1976-77; Brazil, 1980; Mexico, 1975-77.-12-
We can summarize this part of the discussion by saying that the role of
government in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan has been large, as in Latin American,
but it has been systematically different. In Table 1, some summary data show
that there is also no case for calling Asia a case of "small" government
versus Latin America as a case of "big" government by more standard criteria,
such as tax revenues and government expenditure as a percent of GNP, or the
predominance of state enterprise in industrial production and domestic fixed
investment.
A third fundamental aspect of government policy in JKT has been the
promotion of relatively equal income distributions, most fundamentally through
policies that equalized the rural income distribution and that kept the
urban-rural differentials much narrower than in other developing countries.
One measure of the greater income equality in JKT than in Latin America is
shown in Table 2, where income shares of upper and lower quintiles are shown.
By historical accident, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were all pushed to undertake
fundamental land reforms in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In Japan, the
impetus was from the U.S. Occupation authorities, who assumed (with some
exaggeration) that wealthy rural landlords had been important supporters of
Japanese militarism. In Korea, the impetus came from several sources,
including the example of North Korean land reform in 1946, and the fact that
many large landholdings had been held by the Japanese, or by individuals
linked to the Japanese.In Taiwan, the land reform was carried out by the
new Chinese Nationalist government at the expense of a Taiwanese landholder
class to whom the Nationalists had no obligations or ties. As in Korea, the
expulsion of the Japanese made the case for land reform easier. The landTable 2: Income Shares of the Top and Bottom Quintiles











Argentina (1976) 4.4 503 11.4
Brazil (1972) 2.0 66.6 33.3
Mexico (1977) 2.9 57.7 19.9
Japan (1979) 8.7 37.5 4.3
Korea (1976) 5.7 45.3
Taiwan (1976)a 95 35.0 37
aApproximate, read off of chart.
Source:
World Development Report, 1985, Table 28, pp. 228—229, and for Taiwan, Myers
(1986), Figure 6, p. 24.-13-
reform was viewed as vital in establishing peasant support for, or at least
acquiesence in, the Nationalist rule over Taiwan. In all three cases, the
land reform was extensive, virtually eliminating farm tenancy, which was very
extensive prior to the reforms. In Japan in 1936, pure tenancy accounted for
27 percent of farmers, while 42 percent leased some of their land from
landlords (see Allen, 1965). These farmers were converted almost in entirety
to individual proprietors by the reforms. In pre-reform Korea, 49 percent of
the farm households consisted entirely of tenant farmers, while 35 percent
were partly tenants (Cole and Lyman, p. 21). In Taiwan, tenancy accounted
for approximately 44 percent of households before the reform, and dropped to
about 15 percent five years after the land reforms went into effect (Fei,
Ranis, and Kuo, p. 43).
The extent of these land reforms is among the greatest in modern history,
and could be accomplished only because of the extraordinary national
circumstances in each of the countries. Not only was the land redistributed,
but the land reforms represented a substantial expropriation of landlords,
since compensation for the land taken was in each case substantially reduced
by high concurrent inflations. The landlords, without political power in U.S.
Occupied Japan, Taiwan under the Nationalists, and Korea in wartime
conditions, could not effectively mobilize political opposition.
The political and economic importance of these reforms for subsequent
growth cannot be overstated. By creating a rural sector of small, independent
proprietary farmers, the reforms allowed JKT to escape from a seemingly
endless cycle of rural violence and instability, and instead created a
conservative peasantry that lent strong support to the national governments.-14—
In terms of production, the long-term effects were highly salutary, with a
great boost to farmer incentives. In part, this reflects the good fortune of
technology since the reforms applied mainly to paddy rice, for which
plantation-style economies of scale do not exist. In fact, the conversion of
tenants to proprietors probably had little direct effect on technology, since
the pre-reform tenants already worked the land as individual producers.
All studies show that the land reforms directly narrowed the income
distribution to a substantial extent (other factors that also contributed to
income equality were the destruction of wealth by war in all three countries;
the fact that much wealth was held by colonial Japanese in Korea and Taiwan;
and the high inflations in all three countries, which wiped out the values of
government bonds). The land reforms also had a pervasive long-term but
indirect effect on the income distribution by shifting the political balance
towards rural interests. As an interest group, farmers were strengthened
significantly because a tiny class of unpopular landlords was replaced by a
massive class of small and prosperous peasants, who could now voice demands on
their own behalf. In all three countries, government expenditures and
regulations subsequent to the reforms have acted to give positive effective
protection to agriculture, and to devote a sizable fraction of government
infrastructural investment to the rural sector. In the 1986 World Development
Report, for example, Korea is shown to give the highest degree of producer
protection in wheat and rice of all of the countries covered in the study
(Figure 4.1, p. 64; Japan and Taiwan are not in the sample of countries).
In Sachs (1985), I speculated that the political strength of the rural
sector in East Asia could help to explain the historical willingness of the—15—
East Asian economies to make timely exchange rate depreciations, in
distinction to the notorious Latin American resistance to depreciations.
Relying on computable general equilibrium models and well-known analytical
results, I noted that exchange rate depreciations can be expected to transfer
incomes from the urban to the rural sector, compared with a policy of quantity
rationing of foreign exchange. In Asia, rural interests of the class of
independent farmers has been influential. In Latin America after the Great
Depression, the class of rural landlords has lost out to urban interests. In
Asia, the effect of devaluation on income distribution will be neutral or even
equalizing, since incomes of a large class of small farm proprietors will be
raised. In Latin America, the effect will be to widen the income
distribution, or at least will be perceived to be so by political actors,
since large landholders will benefit by increased rental income, while
landless peasants may well experience a fall in their real incomes.
Unfortunately, the IMF Staff Papers has apparently never contained in thirty
years an empirical study on the actual distributional effects of devaluations.
The preceding sketch of the basic macro, trade, and industrial policies
in East Asia might leave the wrong impression that economic success in the
region has been fundamentally the result of particular government policies.
Economists do not know enough even in principle to draw such a conclusion, and
it is also clear that there have been several other factors at work. For
completeness, one must mention: high private-sector savings rates; a low
degree of labor unrest, which in Korea and Taiwan is partly due to government
suppression of union activity; remarkable political stability, with thirty
years of one-party rule in all of the countries (democratically so in Japan,-16-
of course); and extensive political, strategic, and financialsupport from the
U.S., especially in the key early phases of the high growth period.
Finally, we should examine the critical issue of the time phasing of the
policies in JKT. There is much talk about the need f or proper phasing of
stabilization and liberalization, but there is less serious attention to the
matter in practice. The paper by Michalopolous states, for example, that
"There is little disagreement that stabilization needs to precede structural
adjustment if the latter is to succeed." But there are few cases indeed in
which the World Bank has been content to let structural matters sit fora
period of months, not to mention years, while waiting for stabilization to
solidify. The East Asian experience does not suggest that stabilization can
be completed in one year, and liberalization in the next. A successful
phasing is likely to be much more extended.
In the three East Asian countries under review, the postwar periodbegan
with an initial phase of macroeconomic instability, which was followedby
several years of stabilization and import-substituting growth, andeventually
by a turn to export-led growth in the early 1960s.2 In Japan, hyperinflation
prevailed after Japan's defeat in World War II until the stabilizationprogram
of 1949 (the so-called "Dodge Line"). From 1950 to about 1960,growth was
mainly oriented toward import-substitution and the building of domestic
infrastructure. The export-led high growth spurtmay be dated from the onset
of the "Growth Doubling Plan" of 1960. In Korea, thehyperinflation during
the Korean War was not finally brought under firm control until 1957.During
the 1950's, the democratic Administration of Rhee Seung Manpursued a policy
of import—substitution financed heavily by U.S. aid. Theexport—promotion—17--
phase first got started after thetoppling of Rhee in 1960, with a devaluation
in 1961, but it isusually dated to the major policy reforms
undertaken by the
military government of General ParkChung Hee in 1964 and 1965. Theprospects
of the phased withdrawal ofU.S. financial assistance in themid-1950s was a
major prod to these policy changes.In Taiwan, the hyperjnflation ofthe
Chinese Civil War was brought
under control by 1951. As inKorea, the new
government pursued a policy of import
SUbstitution during most of the 1950s.
The prospect of declining u.s.financial assistance wasagain a major spur to
the shift to export promotionat the end of the 1950s. In1958-59 the
Nationalist Government introduced
a devaluation and unification of the
exchange rate, as well as otherreforms, to initiate the phase ofexport-led
growth.
There are three notable features
of these transitions. The firstis the
significant time interval between
economic stabilization and thebeginning of
export-led growth. By the early 1960sin each of the countries, thedire
macroeconomic imbalances of thepreceding decade were long in thepast.
Inflation and budget imbalances hadbeen under control for at leastfive
years. Economic growth was adequate, ifnot spectacular -in Korea andTaiwan,
and it was already truly
spectacular in Japan. The governments hadin hand,
and in prospect, the financialmeans to make large infrastrurai
investments,
to provide export Subsidiesor other fiscal incentives toexports when
desirable, and to avoid a
debilitating fiscal contraction in thenear future.
Of course the economies didnot look as strong inprospect as they now look in
retrospect, and the anticipated withdrawal
of U.S. financial assistance from
Korea and Taiwan was viewed with
great anxiety, but at least the reformswere
not emergency measures.—18-
There are good conceptual reasons for believing that this phasing was
important for the political and economic success of the export-led growth
policies. In an unstable macroeconomic environment, investors are unlikely to
begin to expand export capacity to absorb the slack from a declining
import-competing sector. Moreover, the instruments of stabilization may well
compete with the instruments of liberalization. Stabilization might require
the confidence-building measure of a stable exchange rate; liberalization
might require a real exchange rate devaluation. Stabilization might require a
rise in trade tax revenues; liberalization might require a cut in trade taxes
or even an increase in export subsidies. Stabilization might require a
cutback in public investments; liberalization might require a rise in public
infrastructure investment in ports, communications, and transportation. And
as Calvo (1986) has stressed, the welfare gains from a reform can be
diminished, or even become losses, when the sustainability of the reform is
doubted by the public, or in Calvo's terms, when it is an "incredible reform".
All of these problems obviously afflicted the Southern Cone stabilizations at
the end of the 1970s.
The second important aspect of the transition process was the substantial
levels of U.S. financial assistance provided to each of the countries. There
is presently a dangerous myth that governments can work their economies out of
any difficulties, no matter how severe, if only the correct policies are
followed; the East Asian economies are often taken as examples where such hard
work paid off. The truth, however, in the cases of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan,
is that extensive financial and political assistance from the U.S. was a vital
component of stabilization. (The same key stabilizing role of foreign—19-
assistance, in the form of substantial debt forgiveness,as well as foreign
aid is evident in the case of the Indonesia afterthe fall of Sukarno). The
U.S. paid for a large share of the imports andbudgets of Korea and Taiwan for
most of the 1950s, and U.S. military expenditures inJapan (the so-called
"special procurement funds") similarly providedenormous balance of payments
support. The importance of this foreign aid is illustrated inTable 3, where
we see that U.S. foreign aid to Taiwan and Korea financeda large share of
their imports during the period, and alarge share of government expenditures
(other estimates of import shares covered byforeign aid, as in Mason et al.
(1980), pp. 165-208) in the case of Korea, show aneven larger role for aid).
We will return later to the case for partial debtforgiveness in the Latin
American economies as a way to give them acomparable financial fresh start.
The third aspect of timing involves thepolicy reforms once export-led
growth commences. In none of the countries was therea sudden removal of
tariff or quota protection for domestic industry,or indeed anything
approaching the adoption of a flat tariff of 10 to 20percent in the course of
a five year period (this is the policy recommendation ofBalassa, et al.
(1986, p. 89) for Latin America, one that is made after theinevitable bow to
East Asian success). As Lin (1984, p.46) notes withregard to Korea and
Taiwan:
In fact, systematic decontrol of imports did notoccur in either
country until the late 1960s, well after the success of theirexport
promotion efforts. In the interim, trade liberalizationmeasures
consisted primarily of allowing imports of intermediateproducts
duty—free for use in export processing and of requiring domestic
producers of import substitutes to reduce their prices relativeto
potential imports in order for their products to remain underimport control.
In Japan as well, the process of shifting toexport-led growth got underway
only in the 1960s, and indeed it was not until 1964 that the Yenbecame aTable 3: U.S. Financial Assistance to Korea
and Taiwan, 1955—59
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Taiwan
Total U.S. Aid (Sm) 90.4 97.3 96.9 93.7 86.3
of Taiwan Imports 43 39 36 30 29
Korea
Total U.S. Aid ($m) 149.3 131.4 103.2 97.0 105.9
% ofKorean Imports 46 n.a. 36 30 35
% of Korean Central
Government Expenditures
68 n.a. 27 16 33
Sources:
For Taiwan, Lin (1973), pp. 72—73. For Korea, Cole and Lyman (1971), p. 266,
and International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1985.—20—
convertible currency in the sense of adherenceto Article 8 of the IMF
Articles of Agreement. Even afterJapan adopted the formal commitments to
currency convertibility and to reduced tariffs, theprocess of liberalization
has been slow. Certainly no U.S. tradeofficial would be willing to cite
Japan as a case where rapid liberalizationwas the instrument of export
promotion!
III. Exchange Rate and Trade Policies forthe Latin American Debtors
(a) Overview
When viewed against the backdrop of theEast Asian experience, the
current policy debate over the Latin debtorcountries is problematic in
several ways. Much of the policy debate inLatin America, and between the
Latin American governments and the internationalinstitutions, is about market
liberalization even though across—the-boardliberalization is probably not the
key to export promotion, and even though liberalizationis unlikely to succeed
in the midst of macroeconomicinstability. Also, the international
institutions are addressing income distributionalconcerns in a vague way at
best, even though it is income distributionalconflicts that are at the core
of the many of the region's problems.
For most of the Latin American countries, the
most pressing problem is an
ongoing fiscal crisis that erupted in the early 1980s.The crisis erupted for
several reasons, including: (1)overspending in the 1970s, that left a legacy
of enormous foreign and internal debts;(2) the sharp rise in world interest
rates in 1980, that increased the burden of thepublic sector debt; (3) the
cutoff in international lending to Latin Americangovernments in 1982, that—21—
suddenly left them unable to finance fiscal deficits with foreign loans; (4)
the adverse shift in the terms of trade, which depressed public sector
revenues; and (5) the enormous declines in real income in the Latin countries
since 1982, which have further depressed tax collections. As a result, public
sector finances are under enormous strain in several countries. The very high
inflations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru are the best
reflections of the dire fiscal situation.
The foreign debt crisis in Latin America is to a large extent an aspect
of this fiscal crisis. Three fourths of the foreign debt in Latin America is
a liability of public sectors. The problem of the debt is not only (or even
mainly) that the various countries owe large sums to foreign creditors, but
that the sums are owed by cash-strapped public sectors. In some cases,
particularly Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, it is suspected that the
country's net foreign debt position is rather modest as a percentage of
national income, because the public sector's external debts are matched
partially by the private sector's external assets (the cumulative capital
flight of the past). According to one estimate (Dooley, 1986), by the end of
1983, cumulative capital flight accounted for 61 percent of Argentina's gross
external debt, 44 percent of Mexico's debt, and 77 percent of Venezuela. To
the extent that external debts and assets balance, the relevant transfer
problem is to get money from the private sector to the public sector of the
debtor country, rather than to transfer income between the country and the
rest of the world.
The failure to link the debt crisis and the fiscal crisis has left many
observers puzzled as to why the "debt crisis" doesn't get better despite large—22—
trade surpluses in many of the debtorcountries. Bankers expressedannoyance,
for example, that despite Mexico'slarge trade surpluses in 1984 and 1985, the
Mexican debt situation did not improve. Thebankers' interpretation for
Mexico (and other countries in a similarsituation) was that net export
surpluses were being "lost" in capital flight,so that the net exports were
not reducing Mexico's debt burden. Onepolicy prescription was to prevent the
accumulation of foreign assets by Mexicanexporters. But this view
fundamentally misunderstands the problem. The Mexicangovernment owes the
debt, but it does not own the netexports. The fact that large trade
surpluses did not relieve the debt crisis isa result of the fact that with
national trade surpluses or not, the Mexicangovernment still could not afford
to service the public sector debts.
Even an export boom would have no directbearing on the debt crisis,
except to the extent that it raises national income andtherefore government
revenues. An export boom might improve the welfare ofMexican citizens, but
it would not directly relieve the debt crisisper Se. Policies to stimulate
exports, e.g. large depreciations of the realexchange rate, or tariff cuts on
imports, may worsen or improve the state of thebudget, and if they worsen the
budget deficit they may thereby worsen the debt crisiseven if exports
increase. A cut in tariffs will tend toworsen the budget deficit, and could
well intensify the debt crisis; a conversionof quantitative restrictions to
tariffs will tend to reduce the budgetdeficit, and thus ameliorate the
crisis.
Liberalization measures that do not directly bearon the budget, such as
a removal of quantitative restrictions, can also haveimportant though—23—
indirect effects on the budget balance. Government makes expenditures on
nontradeables (e.g. public sector salaries) and tradeables (e.g. interest
payments on the foreign debt), while collecting income from nontradeables
(e.g. taxes on labor) and tradeables (e.g. earnings from state enterprise
exports, and from trade taxes). Shifts in the relative price of nontradeables
and tradeables can therefore have an important bearing on the budget balance.
With a large overhang of external debt, a real exchange rate depreciation
(i.e. a fall in nontradeables prices relative to tradeables prices) will tend
to worsen the budget deficit. The dollar cost of foreign debt servicing will
stay the same, but the dollar value of domestic tax receipts (which arise
partly from taxes on nontradeables) will tend to fall. Thus, the removal of
quantitative trade restrictions, by tending to cause a real depreciation,
might intensify a budget deficit even if the QRs have no direct fiscal effect.
(On the other hand, in cases where the government receives a large fraction of
income from the sale of tradeable goods by state enterprises, the a real
depreciation might help to reduce the fiscal deficit).
My focus on budget problems does not undermine the case for more
export-led growth for Latin America, but rather stresses the need for a
thorough macroeconomic stabilization of the region as the prerequisite for
long-term growth. The stabilization phase will require several years, and
will have a greater chance of success if the implementation of reforms for
export-led growth is gradual during this phase. The region's long-term growth
prospects will certainly be enhanced by a greater outward orientation, as
stressed in Sachs (1985) among many other places, as long as it takes place in
the context of macroeconomic stability. Judging from the East Asian-24-
experience, the greatest long-term gains to export-oriented growth would bea
more rapid transfer of technology to the region, the exploitation of the
region's comparative advantage in labor—intensive manufacturing, the end of
discrimination against agriculture in region, and the benefits fromimportant
static and dynamic economies of scale achieved by producing for worldmarkets.
Another lesson from East Asia is that as the Latin American countriesmove
toward outward orientation, they may do so with a shared role for thepublic
and private sectors.
Nor should we be pessimistic about export growth over thelonger term.
It is clear that even in the hothouse environment of Latin Americanimport
substitution, many Latin American countries have been able to stimulate
manufacturing exports, a point stressed by Pazos (1985—86). As an example,
Brazil's dollar earnings from manufactured exports rose more than tenfold
between 1972 and 1981, despite a heavily controlled and protectedeconomy
(World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Brazil, 1984, Table 3.3).Manufacturing
exports rose from 21 percent of total exports to 48 percent of total exports.
The key was a realistic exchange rate, attention to labor-intensive
manufactures, and sustained export promotion policies, but not a laissez faire
economy with a liberal import policy.
(b) Inflation Control and Budget Deficits
Without necessary fiscal actions, no extent of exchange rate devaluations
or trade liberalizations can stabilize the economies of Latin America,even if
such policies stimulate exports and improve trade balances. Thelarge
inflations throughout the hemisphere are first and foremost a reflection of—25—
the continuing fiscal deficits. In the absence of fiscal correction,
continuing resort to the inflation tax will be necessary, and the exchange
rate will have to be devalued in line with the underlying budgetary needs for
the inflation tax. If the government attempts to hold the line on a freely
convertible exchange rate without correcting the fiscal situation, it will
lose foreign exchange reserves. If it then institutes exchange controls, and
rations foreign exchange, it will suffer from a growing black market premium
on foreign exchange, which will not prevent prices from rising, but which will
arbitrarily squeeze exporters, to the extent that they have to relinquish
foreign exchange at the official rate, or to the extent that they have to
engage in costly smuggling.
Several countries have attempted to stabilize exchange rates for the
purpose of ending high inflations without correcting underlying budget
deficits. Such a policy for the exchange rates can be seriously harmful, and
particularly pernicious, since the policy will appear to be working in its
early stages, even when the public knows that it will eventually break down.
The dangers can be illustrated with a simple theoretical example. Suppose
that a country is relying on inflation taxation to finance a budget deficit.
Inflation is proceeding at a high rate, and the exchange rate is depreciating
at the same rate, with a constant real exchange rate. Let us assume that
purchasing power parity holds so that by fixing the exchange rate even
temporarily the inflation rate can be made to fall to level of the world
inflation rate, which we will take to be zero. The demand for real money
balances is a decreasing function of the instantaneous inflation rate, and
thus of the instantaneous rate of currency depreciation. Suppose finally that—26—
the currency is perfectly convertible. When thegovernment acts to stabilize
the exchange rate, it freely buys and sells foreign exchange at thatrate
unless and until it runs out of reserves (or hits an acceptable minimum level
of reserves), at which point it allows the exchange rate to float.
If the government starts out with a positive level of reserves it willbe
able to peg the exchange rate for a while (during which time thereserves run
out) even if the budget deficit is not brought under control. The inflation
will temporarily be brought under control. Eventually, thepegged rate will
collapse and the high inflation will return. The specific time pattern of
reserves and inflation in such a case is especially interesting. At the time
that the government begins to peg the rate, inflation drops to zero. Even
though everybody in the economy understands that the program will break down
(perhaps in six months or a year) when the reserves run out, they know the
program will not break down immediately. Therefore, they choose to increase
their holdings of real money balances in the short term, knowing that
inflation will be low during the short period. They rebuildmoney balances by
bringing in assets from abroad, fully preparing to reverse the process before
the fixed rate breaks down and the inflation resumes. Thus,upon the
announcement of the fixed rate, foreign exchange reserves at the central bank
increase, but this is not as a sign of long-term confidence, only ofvery
short-term confidence.
Over time, reserves will fall from their now higher level, while
inflation will be zero. Eventually, reserves will fall low enough that the
prudent private sector will once again begin to move its assets out of the
country. This will occur before the minimum reserve level is reached. A—27—
speculative attack on the central bank will occur, even though reserves appear
to be well above the minimum, and the speculative attack itself will in fact
rapidly drive the reserves down to the minimal level. The pegged exchange
rate collapses, leading to a renewed inflation cum depreciation. Now,
however, the inflation will occur at a faster rate than originally, because
the government is now deeper in net debt (it has lost foreign exchange
reserves during the life of the program). It therefore needs a higher
inflation tax to pay for the higher net interest servicing on its debts.
This basic story captures the essence of many episodes of pegged exchange
rates in recent years. The Martinez de Hoz policies in Argentina (1978-81),
the Aridor policies in Israel (1982—84), and the Cruzado plan in Brazil
(1986-87), have all harbored the misconception that exchange rate
stabilization alone can eliminate a high inflation, even though the underlying
fiscal deficit -is not relieved. In the case of Martinez de Hoz and Aridor,
inflation upon the collapse of the programs was indeed well above the initial
rates, and the same may soon be true of the Cruzado Plan. The advocates of
the these policies often misunderstand even in retrospect why they fail.
After all, the finance minister observes that the reservesgo up at the
beginning (a sign of confidence!) and that inflation stabilizes (success!).
And then, even when reserves appear to be adequate ("oh sure, with a little
slippage"), the program collapses. The public appears to be fickle,
ungrateful, and even a bit unpatriotic, for instigating a run on central bank
reserves.
Even when governments have understood the need for budget cutbacks, there
has been only a slow process of reconstructing the public sectors in Latin-28-
America. There are two interrelated reasons for the lack of decisive
progress. First, the size of the shocks has been enormous, far larger than
anything that industrial countries have had to grapple with in decades.
Second, there is a powerful stalemate over income distribution in most of the
Latin America countries, which prevents decisive fiscal actions. The wealthy
can block higher taxes, but they cannot enforce spending cuts without
provoking unrest. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the external
public debt is a large part of the fiscal burden, and the will to undertake
powerful actions on behalf of foreign commercial banks is understandably
limited. The IMF and World Bank sometimes seem oblivious to the
distributional struggle, which is remarkable given the degree of unfairness
and inequity that is pervasive in Latin American society.
Several of the major Latin American countries exercised remarkable fiscal
laxity during the easy money period of the 1970s. Mexico squandered an
enormous increase in oil revenues with public sector deficits that reached
almost 18 percent of GNP in 1982. Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil similarly
ran large and chronic budget deficits during the 1970s, that were easily
financed with foreign borrowing. By 1980, the public debt levels in these
countries was already extraordinary. The real fiscal crisis did not become
obvious, however, until world interest rates on the public sector debt rose
sharply in the early 1980s and until access to foreign loans was cut off,
which occurred in most countries in 1982 (1981 for Bolivia; 1983 for
Venezuela). The ferocity of the shocks has meant that even stringent
adjustments since 1982 have proven insufficient given the size of the
resulting fiscal crisis. I will illustrate this with a case I know well,-29-
Bolivia, which almost fell into anarchy because of its fiscal crisis (see
Sachs, 1987, for further details). While the Bolivian picture is extreme
(inflation eventually reached 50,000 percent in 1985, before being brought
under control), the underlying mechanics are indicative of Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, and Peru as well.
The Bolivian government was receiving a net foreign transfer of resources
of about 5 percent of GNP during 1978 to 1980. When world interest rates rose
sharply in 1980, Bolivia entered a fiscal crisis, and new lending ceased. A
succession of unstable Bolivian regimes attempted nonetheless to maintain debt
servicing. With skyrocketing world interest rates and no new loans, the net
resource transfer of the public sector shifted to an outflow 5 percent of GNP.
The various Bolivian governments during 1980 to 1983 did little to reduce
spending or increase taxes. Rather, they substituted seignorage (i.e. money
printing) for the lost foreign borrowing. Seignorage as a percent of GNP
therefore rose by almost 10 percent of GNP between 1980 and 1983, about equal
to the size of the shift in net resource transfers.
Inflation naturally accelerated. A new democratic government came to
power in October 1982, determined to stabilize the situation, but it was
overwhelmed by the task. While the Siles government did not raise spending
despite enormous social pressures from its political constituency, and indeed
fought several bitter fights to cut spending, it presided over a collapse of
the tax system before it really recognized it. High inflation undermined a
fragile system of property taxes fixed in nominal terms, specific trade taxes,
specific excise taxes, and income taxes paid with a significant lag. The
Tanzi effect operated with a vengeance. Public sector prices also lagged-30-
seriously in real terms, as did nominal exchange rate devaluations. Between
1980 and the first half of 1985, government revenues as a percent of GNP fell
from about 10 percent to just over 1 percent! Even though the Sues
government presided over the world's worst hyperinflation in 40 years, the
government should not be considered profligate or expansionary. Real cuts in
government spending under Sues were certainly the largest in Bolivian modern
history. The government was overwhelmed by a cumulative process in which
large deficits led to high inflation, an erosion of tax collections, and a
further widening of the budget deficits.
The Paz government was elected in August 1985, and ended the
hyperinflation within two months. Actions on the budget, and supporting
actions on the exchange rate were fundamental. The exchange rate was
stabilized vis-a-vis the dollar, which rapidly stabilized prices, but in
contrast to the earlier theoretical example about fixing the exchange rate,
the exchange rate stabilization took place in the context of deep fiscal
reforms. Government expenditures were reduced by a complete moratorium on
foreign debt payments, as well as by a cut in public sector pay and a virtual
cessation of public investment projects. Government revenues were raised at
first mainly through higher public sector prices, and later via a tax reform
program, which became possible to implement once prices were stabilized.
While the budget crises are less severe in the other debtor countries,
the same pattern is found. The public sectors in each of the major countries
experienced a sharp turnaround from positive to negative net resource
transfers from abroad between 1980 and 1983. In the cases of Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, the governments substituted money financing for part-31-
or all of the lost borrowing. In each of the countries, the cutback in
international lending contributed to a fall in real output, which together
with rising inflation depressed tax revenues. By 1985, the burden of the
external public debt was a very large share of the budget. This is
illustrated in Table 4 for Argentina, Bolivia, and Mexico, by measuring the
external debt and the interest charges on all public debt, relative to general
government revenues. Interest expenses alone account for about a third of
government revenues. (Note, however, that Bolivia has suspended interest
payments to the commercial banks and has rescheduled 100 percent of interest
payments due in 1986 to bilateral official creditors.) In Argentina and
Bolivia, the high inflation wiped out the real value of most of the internal
debt, while in Mexico, the real debt grew rapidly, because domestic bond
financing supported much of government spending during 1983-1986, before the
emergence of triple-digit inflation. Through bond financing, Mexico postponed
its high inflation until recently, but now will pay with much higher inflation
rates than if it had closed its budget deficits earlier.
Debt-strapped governments have several fiscal choices concerning the size
of the deficit and the methods of financing it. Different ways of closing
budget deficits have different macroeconomic consequences, not to mention
distributional consequences. Normally, it is supposed that a cut in the
budget deficit will have a contractionary effect on the real economy in the
short run, and this is probably correct for a shift from debt financing to
higher taxes or reduced spending. However, when the shift is from
inflationary finance to taxes, the contractionary effect is likely to be much
smaller. A rise in taxes that allows a stabilization of prices is really a—32—
shift from one tax, the inflation tax, to another. There is little reason why
such a shift in taxes should be contractionary. For this reason, "shock"
anti-inflation programs, involving simultaneous tax increases and sharp cuts
in inflation, need not have a major contractionary effect on theeconomy. In
the case the fiscal cutback involves a suspension of foreign debt servicing,
as in Bolivia and Peru, then the program might be expansionary on balance,
since the drop in the inflation tax is matched by a decline in transfers to
foreigners, rather than a rise in domestic taxes. The private sector on
balance ends up paying less "taxes" (inclusive of the inflation tax).
The postwar examples of East Asia and the histories of the Central
European hyperinflations teach the limits of fiscal reform. Foreign financing
has almost always been needed to help a government end a high inflation, as we
already noted in the cases of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Foreign largess has
similarly played a role in the Israeli stabilization of 1986, with Israel's
receipt of $4.5 billion of U.S. aid, or about 20 percent of GNP. Some
stabilizations have started without foreign support (e.g. Germany in 1923),
but have been sustained later through foreign finance (e.g. the Dawes Loan of
1924). Since the Latin American countries do not receive much foreign aid,
and are unable to float new stabilization loans, they may be unable to
stabilize without debt relief from the commercial banks and from the bilateral
creditors. The relief would be most effective if it were sanctioned
internationally, as in the case of Indonesia at the end of the 1960s. The IMF
and the World Bank could play a major role in designing international norms
for such relief. But if internationally sanctioned relief is not forthcoming,
then debtor countries may pursue the path of a unilateral debt moratorium, as
have Bolivia and Peru with some success during the past year.-33-
So far, the international institutions have given scant attention to this
case for relief. Indeed, even in the midst of Bolivia's 50,000 percent
hyperinflation, the IMF mission pressed hard on the government for a
resumption of interest servicing on Bolivia's commercial bank debts. This was
despite the fact that normal interest servicing of the bank debts on market
terms would have required about half of central government expenditures at the
time, and a larger share of central government revenues. The Bolivian
Government refused to come to terms with the commercial banks on normal
rescheduling terms, and the IMF threatened to withhold approval of the standby
program. Eventually the Fund relented on this threat. Incredibly, after
several months of price stability in Bolivia in 1986, and after a 50 percent
terms of trade decline (tin and natural gas) in late 1985 and early 1986, the
IMF continued to press for a large devaluation. The Fund complained that the
Bolivian Government could not otherwise close the foreign exchange gap as
computed by the IMF, a gap which included significant interest payments to the
commercial banks. In effect, the IMF was proposing to the Bolivian government
that it use renewed inflation as a financing instrument for renewed debt
servicing. The Government of Bolivia declined the offer.
(c) "Shock" Programs for Ending High Inflations
Shock stabilization programs are now underway (or are in an intermediate
stage of collapse) in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Israel, and Peru. All of
these programs hark back to the ends of the European hyperinflations, as well
as to the ends of the postwar inflations in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, in their
attempt to achieve a sudden end to high inflat-ions (see Sargent, 1982, for-34-
case studies of the ends of the Central European hyperinflations). Of the
group, only Bolivia was suffering from a true hyperinflationary rise in
prices, with inflation equalling 20,000 percent in the twelve months (August
1985 over August 1984) preceding stabilization. In the other cases, the
pre-shock rise in prices was much less: Argentina, 3,000 percent; Brazil, 300
percent; Israel, 700 percent; Peru, 200 percent.
All of the programs share the feature of pegging the exchange rate to the
U.S. dollar as a device for bringing the inflation down suddenly to the world
dollar inflation rate. The central idea is to make this new pegged rate
viable by bringing the government budget deficit under control in a decisive
manner. In Argentina, Brazil, Israel, and Peru, the exchange rate pegging and
the accompanying fiscal actions are complemented with a wage and price freeze,
that aims to make sure that domestic wages and prices stop rising at the same
time that the exchange rate is pegged. Finally, -in Argentina, Brazil, and
Peru, a new currency was introduced at the time of pegging, which served in
Argentina at least as a brilliant technical device to overcome the legacy of
pre-existing financial contracts.
Pegging the exchange rate to end a high inflation is familiar from the
ends of most hyperinflations -in history. A controversial aspect of the
current programs, with the exception of Bolivia, -is the use of wage and price
controls in conjunction with the exchange rate peg. The theoretical argument
for such ancillary policies is clear. The key point is a distinction between
hyperinflations (as in Bolivia), and merely high inflations. During a true
hyperinflation, domestic nominal contracts virtually disappear. Goods prices
are generally quoted in a foreign currency. The domestic prices of—35—
commodities are calculated according to the world price, converted at the spot
exchange rate prevailing at the time of a transaction. Thus, in a true
hyperinflation, stabilizing the exchange rate is sufficient to stabilize the
domestic currency price of goods. At a lower inflation, however, nominal
contracts and lagged indexing schemes still exist. Pegging the exchange rate
is not sufficient to the end the inflation instantaneously, because of the
overhang of nominal wage and price contracts written before the stabilization
is put into effect. The result of immediate pegging can therefore be a
significant and unwarranted real exchange rate appreciation, as in Chile
during 1979—Si. The wage and price controls are used to override the
pre-existing contracts, and to make wages and prices conform to the newly
pegged exchange rate.
In the case of Bolivia, which reached hyperinflationary rates of price
change, pegging the exchange rate was sufficient to stabilize domestic prices,
without the use of wage and price controls (indeed, existing controls were
dismantled at the start of the stabilization program). As documented in Sachs
(1987), domestic prices stopped rising and began falling within 9 days of the
new exchange rate peg. In the cases of the other high inflations, the
starting conditions were much less severe.Pegging the exchange rate was
probably not sufficient to stabflize the exchange rate, and was not perceived
to be so by the national authorities. Thus, controls were instituted along
with the pegged rate. In all of these countries, the initial effect of the
combination of a pegged rate and a wage-price freeze was sufficient to reduce
the measured inflation rate almost to zero. In Brazil and Peru, however, the
controls provoked almost immediate shortages of some commodities, with
attendant black market increases in prices.-36-
As I have illustrated earlier, a pegged exchange rate without
accompanying fiscal actions will have some short-run viability, even if it is
widely believed that the peg will break down in the near future. The key to
maintaining the new peg for the longer term is, of course, a degree of fiscal
adjustment which obviates the need for the inflation tax. While comparable
up-to-date data on fiscal positions are not publicly available for the five
countries with shock programs, it appears that varying degrees of fiscal
correction have been taken. In Bolivia and Israel, the fiscal actions were
deep, and probably large enough to maintain low inflation for a sustained
period of time (unless political pressures force a reversal of the fiscal
austerity). In Argentina and Peru, the fiscal actions were more moderate, and
probably only enough to reduce the inflation rates to high double digits (or
low triple digits) for the near future. In Brazil, the fiscal actions were
probably perverse, in the sense of widening the deficit at the outset of the
program. Not only were real public sector salaries raised, but the government
deficit widened as well because of increased subsidies that were used to help
sustain the price freeze. The absence of corrective fiscal actions in Brazil
has been manifest to close observers of the Cruzado Plan, and this is whymany
expressed widespread skepticism of its success already in the summer of 1986,
despite the near euphoria of the Brazilian government and the international
commercial banks.
It is noteworthy that a major part of the fiscal action in Bolivia, and
perhaps the major fiscal action in Peru, was a partial suspension of interest
payments on external public-sector debts. Quantitatively, this suspension of
payments has been a crucial factor in the success of the Bolivian program.—37—
Perhaps the greatest threat to the program is that the government will
eventually accede to the pressures of the international community to "be
responsible", and resume using the inflation tax to finance debtservicing to
the international creditors. In Israel, the need for suchan action was
largely obviated by the extensive foreign aid received by the U.S.,as well as
by the large fiscal actions in other areas undertaken by the Israeli
authorities. In Argentina and Brazil, where domestic fiscal actions ofthe
necessary magnitude have not been forthcoming, an eventual turn to a debt
servicing moratorium cannot be ruled out.
A crucial aspect of the shock programs is the matter oftiming in the
integration of all of the pieces of the program. A problematic fact of life
is that the exchange rate and price actions will almostnecessarily supercede
many of the supporting fiscal actions. It is simply impossible to plan and
execute a tax reform in the midst of a very high inflation, forexample, so
that price increases must be halted before new kinds of taxrevenues can be
raised. In Bolivia, the tax reform package passed the BolivianCongress only
9 months after the start of the anti-inflationprogram, and the beginning of
implementation took a full year after the start of theprogram. The budget
cycle might similarly require that certain budget cuts be postponed until
after the beginning of the shock program. The lag between theexchange rate
(and wage—price) actions and the supporting fiscal actions need notcripple a
program however as long as expectations are stabilizing during the interim
period, since households give the government some fiscal breathingroom by
rebuilding real money balances (and thereby increasing central bankreserves)
at the beginning of the stabilization program. The real risk is thatthe-38-
authorities come to believe during the interim that the program runs on its
own, without the need for the supporting and politically painful fiscal
actions.
The major unresolved analytical issue in the design of "shock"
anti-inflation programs is the question of interest rates and monetary policy
in the wake of stabilization. Each of the countries has experienced very high
ex post real rates of interest in the wake of stabilization. Dornbusch (1986)
has attributed the high real rates to the failure of the monetary authorities
to allow the money supply to rise adequately in response to falling
inflationary expectations. Sachs (1987) attributes the high rates in Bolivia
to a continued lack of confidence in the program for many months after its
inception. Blejer and Liviatan (1986) seem to support this latter view for
the cases of Argentina and Israel. To the extent that the high rates reflect
tight monetary conditions, there may be a case for an initial expansion of
domestic credit at the beginning of the program in order to supply the
increased money demand. To the extent that the high rates reflect a
continuing lack of confidence, however, such a domestic credit expansion will
just cause a loss of central bank reserves, and would further undermine
confidence.
(d) Income Distributional Aspects of stabilization
There are always two fundamental ways to reduce a budget deficit: higher
taxes or lower expenditures.Their distributional consequences are of course
very different. There is an overwhelming presumption these days at both the
IMF and World Bank that lower expenditures are the appropriate method of—39—
adjustment. Blejer and Liviatan (1986, p. 28) are typical of this view in
claiming blithely that "the basic task of reducing the public sector is,
therefore, the main test the [anti-inflation] programs [of Israel and
Argentina] must face in the longer term." Ironically, they discuss favorably
the 1967 Argentine stabilization program, without ever noting that the program
collapsed in an explosion of labor unrest (the so-called Cordobazo) two years
after its inception. The problem for Argentina, and the other countries of
the region, has long been to find a set of stabilization policies that are
both technically sound but also socially sustainable. Programs based mainly
on spending cuts will probably not fit these requirements in many Latin
American countries.
Here once again we are reminded of a crucial, but unappreciated, lesson
of East Asia. The policy freedom of the East Asian economies to undertake
adjustments in the name of efficiency exists by virtue of the relatively equal
income distributions in these countries. In the absence of such income
equality, policies oriented mainly towards efficiency may exacerbate an
already very unequal income distribution, and may be enforceable only with
heavy repression, as in Chile. Consider, for example, the policy prescription
of a deep real exchange rate depreciation for the purpose of export promotion.
In Latin American economies characterized by highly unequal land and natural
resource holdings, such a policy might have very adverse distributional
consequences, and may indeed be politically destabilizing. The same policy in
the more egalitarian setting of East Asia might be both economically and
politically efficacious.
The distributions of income in the Latin American countries are among the
most unequal in the world, and most observers suspect that income inequalitiesTable 4: Budgetary Burden of Public Debt, Selected
Indicators for Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico
(as proportions of total government revenues)






Argentina (1985) 255 27.3 3.1 30.4
Bolivia (1985) 1200 28a -- 28
Mexico (1986) 184 15.5 17•8b
acommercial bank debt only, which is approximately one fourth of total
external debt.
blnflation corrected, thus representing the real interest burden.Table 5: Shares of Public Expenditures on
Education and Health (percent)
Country












ECLAC (1986), Table 19, p. 111.—40-
have widened considerably in the 1980s (see, for example, ECLAC, 1986).
Upper-income individuals have systematically escaped the brunt of the crisis
through capital flight, government takeovers of private external debts on
favorable terms, and in some cases, declines in tax burdens, while lower
income individuals have suffered through reduced public sector expenditures,
especially in education and health, and sharply lower real wages in the public
and private sectors. Table 5 shows that in the midst of cuts in overa1l
public sector expenditure, the cuts in education and health expenditure have
been even sharper than average. (Unfortunately, the data are available only
through 1983; the situation since has probably become much worse.) Peru
provides a remarkable and tragic example of this situation. Between 1981 and
1984, cutbacks in expenditures forced a reduction in Food Aid to mothers of 54
percent; to nursing mothers and pre-schoolers of 37 percent; and to school age
children of 17 percent (ECLAC, 1986, p.53).
The World Bank and IMF should realize that increases in taxes, especially
on upper incomes and property, rather than cuts in public expenditures, can
often bring about more equitable adjustments to the current crisis and perhaps
increase the chances of success for stabilization programs. We have seen that
when compared with East Asia, the Latin American countries are not overtaxed,
and indeed if anything are undertaxed. There is simply no evidence for the
proposition that spending cuts, rather than tax increases, are to be vastly
preferred on efficiency grounds as the method of adjustment. Indeed in the
absence of much more vigorous policies to meliorate the extremes in income
inequality in Latin America, the likelihood of sustained and durable economic
growth in a context of social stability may be dim indeed.—41-
IV. Conclusions
This paper takes issue with the urgent priority that the IMF and the
World Bank appear to be giving to market liberalization in the debtor
countries.I suggest that the more pressing problem in these countries is the
prolonged fiscal crisis, which has caused a sharp retrenchment of public
sector investment and social welfare expenditures and has led to high
inflations in several countries. To a large extent the international debt
crisis is a reflection of this fiscal crisis, rather than a reflection of the
transfer problem from debtor nations to creditor nations. The experience of
the successful countries in East Asia is invoked to suggest threemajor
lessons. First, stabilization has almost always precededany dramatic shift
to liberalization. Second, export orientation has been pursued withoutan
across-the-board import liberalization and can be fostered by an activist
government. Third, the relatively equal income distributions in East Asia
have freed the hand of governments to focus on issues of efficiency. For this
reason in addition to social equity itself, adjustment programs in Latin
America may well improve their chances of success if they aim inpart to
improve the extremely unequal income distributions in these economies.
The paper also investigates the use of shock treatments to endhigh
inflations. Such programs, as now underway with significant success in
Bolivia and Israel, and partial success in Argentina and Peru, combinea
pegged exchange rate with fiscal discipline to achieve a rapid disinflation.
In the context of hyperinflation, as in Bolivia, pegging theexchange rate is
sufficient to end the hyperinflation. For high inflations, but not
hyperinflations, the presence of inertial inflation may provide a reason for-42-
supplementing the exchange rate pegging with incomes policies and price
freezes. A troubling part of these programs is that almostinevitably some of
the fiscal retrenchment will have to proceed after the initialexchange rate
pegging, since major tax increases are likely to be achievable only after the
high inflation has been brought under control. This means that the initial
step of pegging the exchange rate is fraught with the danger that the fiscal
actions will not be forthcoming. This danger is increased by the fact that
for a short period of time a program based solely on exchange ratepegging
will appear to be successful, with reserves increasing and inflation
decelerating.
Given the centrality of the fiscal crisis in Latin America, and the
political and economic limits of rapid fiscal reform, a greater measure of
debt relief may have a role to play in the stabilizationprocess. Substantial
foreign assistance has been a major factor in the ends of most high
inflations, including the hyperinflations in Central Europe, the highpostwar
inflations in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the post-Sukarno hyperinflation in
Indonesia, and the end of the high Israeli inflation in 1986. Similarly, a
suspension of debt service payments was instrumental inendingthe recent
hyperinflation in Bolivia. Such actions may substantially improve the
prospects for successful stabilization in some of the other debtor countries.
The outcomes in such a case would be greatly enhanced if the relief is
implemented in a cooperative arrangement, mediated by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, rather than as a unilateral step by the debtor
governments.-43-
Footnotes
1.See Floyd, R. H., et al., Public Enterprise in Mixed Economies,
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1984, Table 1.
2.The very high inflation rates in the three economies gives an indication
of the extent of the initial macroeconomic imbalances. Annual inflation rates
reached 334 percent in Japan in 1947, 500 percent in Korea in 1951, and 3,400
percent in Taiwan in 1950.-44-
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